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Viale T. Michel 11, 15121 Alessandria, Italy
e-mail : raiteri@mfn.unipmn.it, robertonai@libero.it
Abstract
This report provides all the details about the models and the quantitative results presented in [1],
about the simulation of communication scenarios inside the Electrical Power System. In particular, the
scenarios deal with the communication between one area control centre and a set of substations in a
distribution grid, exchanging commands and signals by means of a redundant communication network.
The communication may be affected by threats such as the communication network failure, or intrusions
into the communication, causing the loss of commands or signals. The scenarios have been modeled and
simulated in form of Stochastic Activity Networks, with the purpose of evaluating the effects of such
threats on the communication reliability.
Acronym list:
EPS Electrical Power System
kbps kilobit per second
SAN Stochastic Activity Network
SPN Stochastic Petri Net
1 Introduction
This work was developed inside the EU funded project named CRUTIAL (CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL
resilience) [2] and addressing the resilience of the Electrical Power System (EPS). This system can be struc-
tured in three subsystems (Fig. 1):
• the Power generation consists of the set of plants generating the electric power;
• the Transmission grid is the set of high voltage (HV) electric lines, substations and control centres
necessary to transport the electric power from the power plants to the distribution grid of each region
of the territory;
• the Distribution grid is the set of medium (MV) or low voltage (LV) electric lines, substations and
control centres in charge of transporting the electric power from the transmission grid to the consumers
located in a certain region.
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Figure 1: The general EPS architecture.
In this report, we take into account some of the critical scenarios defined in [3] and dealing with the com-
munication between a control centre and a set of substations inside a distribution grid. This communication
consists of the delivery of commands from the control centre to the substations, and the delivery of signals
from the substations to the control centre. This communication is performed through the Internet and the
aim of the scenarios is investigating the effects of several threats to the delivery of commands or signals. For
instance, an attacker may perform an intrusion in the communication with the possibility of sending fake
commands to the substations with the aim of causing their malfunctioning. In another scenario, the failure
of the communication network may compromise the exchange of data between the control centre and the
substations. In this report, we model and simulate the scenarios under exam in form of Stochastic Activity
Networks (SAN) [4], a particular form of Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) [5]; the purpose is evaluating the effect
of failures and attacks to the communication between the control centre and the set of substations, in terms
of probability and quantity of lost data. The design, the composition and the simulation of the SAN models
have been performed by means of the Mo¨bius tool [6, 7].
The report is structured as follows: Sec. 2 describes the case study under exam specifying the communi-
cation protocol between the involved sites in case of transmission of commands and signals, together with the
possible threats to the communication in each scenario. Sec. 3 provides some general notions about the SAN
formalism, while in Sec. 4, the SAN models of the several aspect of the case study are described in detail;
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then, such models are composed in order to obtain the models of the scenarios. The results of the model
simulation are reported in Sec. 5.
2 The case study
The scenarios under exam [3] deal with the communication between a control centre and a set of substations
inside a distribution grid, with the aim of sending commands from the control centre to the substations, and
signals from the substations to the control centre (Fig. 2). Such transmissions are performed by means of a
redundant communication network.
Typically a substation is connected to several electrical lines for the electrical power transportation, and
executes the commands coming from the control centre. Such commands usually concern some operations to
be performed to the electrical lines. In the case of the distribution grid, the same command may be sent to
all the substations, for instance, an arming or disarming command [3]. The generation of a command by the
control centre is a stochastic event occurring as a consequence of a command coming from the transmission
grid, or as a consequence of the state of the distribution grid described by the signals coming from the
substations.
The signals sent from the substations to the control centre may describe the state of the substation or the
state of the electrical lines connected to the substation. Such information are useful to the control centre in
order to monitor the state of the portion of the distribution grid under its control. Signals are periodically
transmitted from the substations to the control centre.
So, the communication of commands and signals is fundamental for the correct functioning of the EPS.
Anyway, such communication may be affected by threats such as attacks and failures. The aim of the scenarios
under study, is evaluating their impact on the communication reliability.
2.1 Command and signal sessions
In our case study, we suppose that each command generated by the control centre has to be executed by
all the substations; therefore, a copy of the command is sent to each substation. Moreover, we assume
that the execution of command by a substation is notified to the control centre by the transmission of an
acknowledgment coming from the substation. So, the generation, the transmission and the execution of a
command are performed according to the following sequence of operations that we call “command session”:
1. the control centre opens the command session: it generates the command and starts collecting the
acknowledgments coming from the substations and concerning the command execution, until a certain
time out expires;
2. a copy of the command is transmitted on the available communication network to each substation;
4
Figure 2: The scheme of the case study.
3. each substation executes the command and generates an acknowledgment proving the execution of the
command;
4. each acknowledgment is transmitted on the available communication network to the control centre;
5. the time out for the acknowledgments collection expires and the command session is closed.
If the number of substations is N , a command session is successful if at least N − 1 acknowledgments are
received by the control centre before that the time out expires. If instead, more than one acknowledgment is
missing when the time out expires, then the command session is considered to be failed. In the case study
investigated in this report, we suppose that N is equal to 10 (10 substations are present in the case study).
We assume that at most one command session is running at a certain time, so parallel command sessions are
not possible.
In our case study, the time for an event to occur can be a deterministic time or a random time; in the
first case, the time to occur is a constant, while in the second case, such time is a random variable ruled by
a negative exponential distribution whose rate is equal to the inverse value of the mean time for the event
to occur. Let us consider the command session: the time for the control centre to generate a command is
random and is equal to 6 h on average (the mean time between two command sessions is 6 h on average).
The transmission of a command (or any other kind of packet) by the communication network takes 1 sec. on
average. The time to execute a command and generate the corresponding acknowledgment by the substation,
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takes 1 sec. on average. The time out for the acknowledgments collection by the control centre, is exactly
20 sec.
In the case study investigated in this report, we suppose that signals are not sent by a substation in an
autonomous way, but we assume that they are generated as a reply to a poll request: periodically the control
centre polls all the substations by sending a poll request to each of them, and they reply by sending a signal
to the control centre.
The protocol for the communication of signals is similar to the case of the communication of commands:
we call “signal session” the following sequence of operations:
1. the control centre opens the signals sessions: it generates a poll and starts collecting signals coming
from the substations, until a certain time out expires;
2. a poll request is transmitted on the available communication network to each substation;
3. each substation generates the signal;
4. each signal is transmitted on the available communication network to the control centre;
5. the time out for the signals collection expires and the signal session is closed.
A signal session is successful if at least N − 1 signals are collected by the control centre before the time out
expiration, where N is the number of substations (N = 10). So, if at least two signals are missing when the
time out expires, then the signal session is considered to be failed. We assume that at most one signal session
is running at a certain time, so parallel command sessions are not possible. A signal session may be running
in parallel with a command session.
The time between the closure of a signal session and the opening of the next one, is exactly 5 min., while
the time for the substation to generate the signal is 1 sec. on average. The time out for the signals arrival
at the control centre is exactly 20 sec. The occurrence (mean) times for the events in a command or signal
session, are summarized in Table 1.
2.1.1 Packets transmission
In our case study, the transmission of the command copies, the acknowledgments, the poll requests and the
signals, is performed according to the Internet protocols assuming that two communication networks (NET1
and NET2) can be exploited to transmit.
NET1 is usually used for the communication between the control centre and the substations. We suppose
that the bandwidth of each communication network is equal to 16 kbps and that the transmission of each
packet consumes 1 kbps of the bandwidth. This means that no more than 16 packets can be transmitted on
the same communication network at the same time. For example, if 10 signals are generated at the same time,
6
Event Type of event (mean) time to occur occurring rate
command generation stochastic 6.000E+00 h 1.667E-1 h−1
command execution stochastic 2.778E-04 h 3.600E+3 h−1
time out for ack. deterministic 5.556E-03 h -
poll generation deterministic 8.333E-02 h -
signal generation stochastic 2.778E-04 h 3.600E+3 h−1
time out for signals deterministic 5.556E-03 h -
packet transmission stochastic 2.778E-04 h 3.600E+3 h−1
Table 1: The (mean) occurrence time (and the corresponding rates) for the events in a command or signal
session.
they will consume 10 kbps of the bandwidth of NET1: during their transmission, the bandwidth of NET1
available for the eventual transmission of other packets is 6 kbps. When NET1 completes the transmission of
the signals, the available bandwidth of NET1 is 16 kbps again. But, it may happen that the current available
bandwidth of NET1 is not enough to transmit all the packets. In this case, NET2 is used to transmit the
packets that NET1 can not transmit. This may happen if a command session and a signal session are running
in parallel way. For instance, let us assume that the bandwidth of NET1 is currently consumed to transmit
10 signals, and before their transmission is complete, 10 acknowledgments are generated. In this case, 6
acknowledgments will be transmitted by NET1 with the consequent complete consume of its bandwidth,
while the remaining 4 acknowledgments will be directed to NET2 for the transmission. Another situation
where NET2 can be exploited for transmission is the case of the failure of NET1, as described in Sec. 2.2.2.
Actually, we could have specified that the transmission of a packet requires less than 1 kbps of the band-
width, or that a communication network has a bandwidth higher than 16 kbps; in this way, the communication
network would be able to transmit more than 16 packets at the same time. Our choice depends on the fact that
one of the goals of the scenarios is evaluating the effect of the bandwidth consumption to the communication
reliability. To this aim, if the communication networks had an higher transmission capacity, then we would
need to consider more than 10 substations in the scenarios, eventually making the simulation computational
costs worse.
2.2 Threats to the communication
The communication between the control centre and the substations may be affected by several threats causing
the loss of commands, acknowledgments, poll or signals, and therefore determining the failure of command or
signal sessions. In this report, we focus on the possibility of intrusions into the communication between the
sites, where the intruder can send fake commands to the substations causing their temporary malfunctioning.
Moreover, we focus on the possibility of temporary failure of the communication network NET1 or NET2,
with the consequent temporary impossibility to transmit on the failed network.
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Event mean time to occur occurring rate
intrusion occurrence 720 h 0.00139 h−1
intrusion duration 5 h 0.2 h−1
fake command generation 1 h 1.0 h−1
substation recovery 12 h 0.08333 h−1
Table 2: The mean occurrence time and the corresponding rates about the events in the intrusion. The
probability of execution of a fake command by the substation is 0.01.
2.2.1 Intrusion and transmission of fake commands
We suppose that attackers may succeed in performing intrusions into the communication between the control
centre and the substations: during an intrusion and by exploiting NET1 or NET2, the attacker may send
several fake commands to the substations pretending to be the control centre. We assume that each fake
command is sent to all the substations, and each substation is able to distinguish the fake commands from
the original ones: if such protection is successful the fake command is discarded, but it may happen that
the protection fails and as a consequence, the fake command is executed by the substation. This determines
the temporary failure of the substation functions, so during the period of unavailability, the substation does
not react to the command copies or poll requests received from the control centre (or to eventual other fake
commands). This may lead to the failure of command or signal sessions because the control centre will
not receive any acknowledgment or signal by the unavailable substation. The substation unavailability is
temporary: the failure of the substation due to the execution of a fake command, can be recovered, so the
substation can turn available again replying to commands and polls. A fake command may be generated
while a command session, a signal session, or both are running.
We suppose that an intrusion occurs every month on average. During an intrusion, a fake command is
sent by the attacker every hour on average. The duration of an intrusion is 5 h on average. The mean time
to recover the substation from the execution of a fake command, is 12 h. Such times and the corresponding
rates are summarized in Table 2. The probability that the substation protection discards a fake command is
0.99, so the probability that a substation executes a fake command is 0.01. We assume that no more than
one intrusion can be running at the same time.
2.2.2 Communication Network failure
The communication between the control centre and the substations is allowed by the communication networks
(NET1 and NET2 ). Each of them may become unavailable due to its own failure; we assume that such
unavailability is temporary because the failure can be recovered. Since NET1 and NET2 are redundant,
if NET1 network is not available, then the NET2 can be used for the transmission among the sites. Since
a communication network can not transmit more than 16 packets at the same time (Sec. 2.1.1), if only one
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Component MTTF Failure Rate MTTR Repair Rate
NET1 720 h 0.00139E-3 h−1 12 h 0.08333 h−1
NET2 720 h 0.00139E-3 h−1 12 h 0.08833 h−1
Table 3: The mean time to fail (MTTF), the failure rate, the mean time to repair (MTTR) and the repair
rate of the communication networks.
network is available at a certain time, its bandwidth may not be enough to transmit all the packets; this
may happen if a command session is running in parallel with a signal session, or if a fake command has been
generated during a command or signal session. In this case, some packets may be lost. For instance, if NET1
is failed, NET2 is working, its bandwidth is currently used to transmit 10 signals, and 10 acknowledgments
are generated in the meanwhile, then 6 acknowledgments will consume the available bandwidth of NET2
and the remaining 4 acknowledgments can not be transmitted and they will be lost.
Besides the command and signal sessions, the failure of the communication network NET1 or NET2 may
compromise the transmission of fake commands as well. The communication between the control centre and
the substation becomes impossible if both NET1 and NET2 are unavailable at the same time. The mean
time to failure and the mean time to repair of NET1 and NET2 are reported in Table 3.
2.3 Scenarios definition
In this report, we are interested to evaluate the case study in three scenarios:
• Scenario 1: the communication network failures may not occur, but the intrusions may occur;
• Scenario 2: the communication network failures may occur, but the intrusions may not occur;
• Scenario 3: both the communication network failures and the intrusions may occur.
3 Basic notions about the SAN formalism
SANs can be considered as a particular form of Stochastic Petri Nets (SPN) [5]. So, a SAN model is
characterized by places, each containing a certain number of tokens (marking). A place graphically appears
as a circle. In the SAN formalism, there are no coloured tokens [8, 9]. The marking of a certain set of places
enables the completion (firing) of activities (transitions) whose effect is modifying in some way the marking
of the places. Activities graphically appear as vertical bars.
In the SAN formalism, the completion of an activity can be instantaneous (immediate) or timed. In
the second case, the completion time can be a constant value or a random value. If the completion time
is random, its value has to be ruled by a probability distribution; in this report, we always resort to the
negative exponential one, but several other distributions are available in the SAN formalism. Moreover, in
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this report, we call “immediate activity” an activity completing as soon as it is enabled; we call “deterministic
activity” an activity whose time to complete is deterministic and not immediate; we call “stochastic activity”
an activity whose time to complete is a random variable ruled by the negative exponential distribution.
The completion of an activity of any kind is enabled by a particular marking of a set of places. Such
marking can be expressed by connecting the activity to the places by means of oriented arcs, as it is possible
in SPNs. The effect of the activity completion can be specified in the same way. Another way to express the
marking enabling a certain activity consists of using input gates. An input gate is connected to an activity
and to a set of places; the input gate is characterized by two expressions:
• a predicate consists of a Boolean condition expressed in terms of the marking of the places connected
to the gate; if such condition holds, then the activity connected to the gate is enabled to complete.
• a function expresses the effect of the activity completion on the marking of the places connected to the
gate.
Besides input gates, a SAN model can contain output gate as well. An output gate has to be connected
to a certain activity and to a set of places. The role of an output gate is specifying only the effect of the
activity completion on the marking of the places connected to the output gate. Therefore, an output gate
is characterized only by a function. The marking enabling the same activity can be expressed by means of
oriented arcs, or by means of an input gate. Gates graphically appear as triangles.
In a SAN model, it is possible to set several completion cases for an activity; each case corresponds to a
certain effect of the completion and has a certain probability: when the activity completes, one of the case
happens. A case graphically appears as a small circle close to the activity; from the case an arc is directed
to a gate or to a place. An example of SAN model is shown in Fig. 4.
The Replicate/Join formalism [7] was conceived for SAN models; such formalism allows to express by
means of a tree structure, the way to compose together several SAN models in a unique large composed
model. In the tree structure, leaf nodes are atomic SAN models, each non leaf node is a Join or Replicate
operator, and the root node is the model resulting from the composition of atomic models according to the
operators in the tree. In particular, the Join operator compose two or more SAN models by superposition
over their common places; the Replicate operator constructs a model consisting of a number of identical
copies of a certain SAN model (copies may share common places). An example of composed model is shown
in Fig. 8.
The design, the composition and the analysis or simulation of SAN models is supported by the Mo¨bius
tool [6, 7, 10, 11, 12]. Further information about the SAN formalism can be found in [4].
10
4 Modelling the case study in form of SAN
This section presents and describes the SAN models of the case study. Each SAN represents a particular
aspect, such as the control centre functions, the packet transmission, the substation functions, the intrusions,
the communication network failures. The SAN models share some common places acting as the points of
connection for the composition of the the models of the scenarios (see Sec. 4.4).
4.1 Modelling the command and signal sessions
In this section, we first consider the models about the command sessions and the signal sessions (see Sec. 2.1).
They involve the control centre functions (generation of commands and polls, collection of acknowledgments
and signals), the transmission of packets (commands copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals) by the
communication network NET1 or NET2, and the substation functions (execution of commands, generation
of acknowledgments, generation of signals).
4.1.1 Modelling the control centre functions
The functions of the control centre are the generation of commands and the collection of acknowledgments, or
the generation of polls and the collection of signals. Such functions are represented by the SAN model called
“Control Centre Functions” and appearing in Fig. 3 where the upper part of the model concerns the command
session (command generation and the acknowledgments collection): the stochastic activity called com gener
models the generation of a command; the effect of its completion (defined inside the input gate I com gener)
is opening the command session by marking the place com session open with one token. Moreover, such
activity marks both the place com queue and the place pending com with 10 tokens (10 substations are
present in the case study).
The generated command has to be sent to all the substations: each token inside the place com queue
represents a copy of the command to be transmitted to a particular substation. The tokens inside the place
com queue are consumed by an activity in the SAN model called “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5, where
such place is present as well. The SAN model in Fig. 5 represents the transmission of packets (commands,
acknowledgments, polls, signals), as described in Sec. 4.1.3.
After the generation of a command, the control centre collects the acknowledgments about the command
execution, coming from the substations. The marking of the place pending com corresponds to the number of
command copies for which the acknowledgment has not arrived yet: the marking of the place ack corresponds
to the incoming acknowledgments during a command session; such place is marked by an activity in the
SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5). As soon as a token appears in the place ack, the activity
new ack removes the token from both the place ack and the place pending com, according to the output gate
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O new ack. In this way, we model that the control centre is aware that the command has been executed by
one of the substations.
The expiration of the time out for the acknowledgments collection is represented by the deterministic
activity ack time out enabled by the marking of the place com session open (input gate I ack time out): the
effect of its completion is verifying that enough acknowledgments have arrived to the control centre when the
time out expires; if the place pending com contains more than one token (more than one acknowledgment is
missing), then the command session is considered as failed and the marking of the place com session failed is
increased by one. Such place counts the number of failed command sessions. After such verification, the same
activity closes the command session by removing the token inside the place com session open, as defined in
the input gate I ack time out.
We suppose that at most one command session is running at a certain time, so parallel command sessions
are not possible: the input gate I com gener allows the completion of the activity com gener only when the
place com session open is not marked (the previous session has been closed).
The lower part of the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” in Fig. 3 is specular to the upper part,
but it represents the signal sessions (the generation of polls and the collection of signals). The generation of
a poll is modelled by the deterministic activity poll gener opening the signal session by marking the place
sig session open with one token. The same activity marks both the place poll queue and the place pending poll
with 10 tokens, where 10 is the number of substations. Such effect of the activity poll gener is specified in
the input gate I poll gener. The poll has to be transmitted to all the substations, so the tokens inside the
place poll queue represents the poll requests to be sent to the substations. Such place is present in the SAN
model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5.
After the poll generation, the control centre collects the signals coming from the substations. The marking
of the place pending poll indicates the number of substations that still have to send the signal during the
signal session. The incoming signals are modelled by the tokens inside the place sig appearing in the SAN
model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5 as well. As soon as a token appears in sig, the activity new sig
completes, removing the token from both the place sig and the place pending poll, according to the output
gate O new sig. In this way, we model that the control centre has received the signal coming from one of the
substations.
The expiration of the time out for the signals collection is represented by the completion of the deter-
ministic activity sig time out enabled by the marking of the place sig session open, as specified in its input
gate I sig time out. When this activity completes, it verifies that the place pending poll does not contain
more than one token. If so, the signal session has failed (more than one signal is missing), and the activity
sig time out increases by one the marking of the place sig session failed counting the number of failed signal
sessions. This is specified in the input gate I sig time out.
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Figure 3: “Control Centre Functions”: the SAN model of the control centre functions.
We suppose that parallel signal sessions are not possible: the input gate I poll gener allows the activity
poll gener to complete only when the place sig session open is empty (the previous session has been closed).
Table 4 shows the completion times and the input or output gates associated with each activity in the
SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3).
4.1.2 Modelling the substation functions
The functions performed by a substation are modelled in the SAN model called “Substation Functions”
and appearing in Fig. 4. The upper part of the model is about the execution of commands. The place
com contains the command copies received by the substations. Such place appears also in the SAN model
“Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5). By means of the immediate activity get com ruled by the input gate
I get com, one token is moved from the place com into the place ack req and into the place current com.
In this way, we model that the substation is ready to execute one of the command copies (marking of the
place ack req), and that no other commands will be executed during the same command session by the same
substation (marking of the place current com). The execution of the command and the generation of the
acknowledgment are modelled by the stochastic activity com exec moving the token from the place ack req
to the place ack queue representing the presence of acknowledgments to be transmitted to the control centre.
The place ack queue is present also in the model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
The central part of the model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4 concerns the generation of signals by the
substation. The marking of the place poll represents the poll requests received by the substations. Such
place appears also in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5. By means of the immediate activity
get poll ruled by the input gate I get poll, one token is moved from the place poll into both the place sig req
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Activity: com gener (stochastic)
completion rate: 1.66667E-01 h−1
input gate: I com gener
input gate predicate: (com session open->Mark()==0) && (Alert->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: com session open->Mark()=1;
pending com->Mark()=10;
com queue->Mark()=10;
Activity: new ack (immediate)
output gate: O new ack
output gate function: if (pending com->Mark() > 0)
pending com->Mark()–;
Activity: ack time out (deterministic)
time to complete: 5.55556E-03 h
input gate: I ack time out
input gate predicate: com session open->Mark()==1
input gate function: com session open->Mark()=0;
if (pending com->Mark() > 1)
com session failed->Mark()++;
Activity: poll gener (deterministic)
time to complete: 8.33333E-02 h
input gate: I poll gener
input gate predicate: (sig session open->Mark()==0) && (Alert->Mark() > 0)
input gate function: sig session open->Mark()=1;
pending poll->Mark()=10;
poll queue->Mark()=10;
Activity: new sig (immediate)
output gate: O new sig
output gate function: if (pending poll->Mark() > 0)
pending poll->Mark()–;
Activity: sig time out (deterministic)
input gate: I ack time out
input gate predicate: sig session open->Mark()==1
output gate function: sig session open->Mark()=0;
if (pending poll->Mark() > 1)
sig session failed->Mark()++;
Table 4: The activities in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3).
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and the place current poll. In this way, we model that the substation is ready to generate a signal as a reply
to a poll request (marking of the place sig req), and that no other signals will be generated during the session
by the same substation (marking of the place current poll). The generation of the signal is modelled by the
stochastic activity sig gener moving the token from sig req into the place sig queue representing the signals to
be transmitted to the control centre. The place sig queue appears in the SAN model “Packets Transmission”
in Fig. 5 as well.
The lower part of the model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4 concerns the discard or the execution of fake
commands received from the attacker. When the attacker generates a fake command, a copy of it is sent to
each substation by means of NET1 or NET2. The marking of the place fake represents the fake command
copies received by the substations. Such place appears also in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” in
Fig. 5. By means of the immediate activity get fake ruled by the input gate I get fake, one token is moved
from the place fake into both the place fake req and the place current fake. In this way, we model that the
substation is ready to deal with the fake command by discarding or executing it (marking of the place sig req),
and that no other copy of the same fake command will be considered by the same substation (marking of the
place current fake). The discard or the execution of the fake command is modelled by the stochastic activity
fake exec; such activity removes the token inside the place fake req and is characterized by two completion
cases modelling the execution or the discard of the fake command respectively: if the first case happens, then
the place substation ko modelling the state of the substation becomes marked with one token, in order to
represent the failed state. If instead the second case happens, such place remains empty (the substation is
still available).
The functions of the substation (execution of (fake) commands and generation of signals) can not be
performed if the substation is currently failed. If the place substation ko becomes marked, then all the
immediate activities get com, get poll and get fake are disabled, while all the immediate activities discard com,
discard poll and discard fake are enabled according to the predicate defined in the input gates I discard com,
I discard poll and I discard fake respectively. In this situation, one token in the places com, poll or fake is
consumed if they are marked, but no (fake) commands are executed and no signals are generated. In this
way, we model that in case of substation failure, though a (fake) command copy or a poll request is received
by the substation, there is no reaction by the substation until its recovery: the stochastic activity recovery
removes the token inside the place substation ko in order to represent that the substation has turned back to
the working state.
Table 5 and Table 6 summarize the activities inside the model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4), including
the predicates and the functions of the gates ruling the completion of the activities.
15
Activity: get com (immediate)
input gate: I get com
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==0 && current com->Mark()==0 &&
com->Mark()>0
input gate function: current com->Mark()=1;
com->Mark()–;
Activity: com exec (stochastic)
completion rate: 3600 h−1
Activity: discard com (immediate)
input gate: I discard com
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==1 && current com->Mark()==0 &&
com->Mark()>0
input gate function: current com->Mark()=1;
com->Mark()–;
Activity: no com (immediate)
input gate: I no com
input gate predicate: com session open->Mark()==0
Activity: get poll (immediate)
input gate: I get poll
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==0 && current poll->Mark()==0 &&
poll->Mark()>0
input gate function: current poll->Mark()=1;
poll->Mark()–;
Activity: sig gener (stochastic)
completion rate: 3600 h−1
Activity: discard poll (immediate)
input gate: I discard poll
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==1 && current poll->Mark()==0
&& poll->Mark()>0
input gate function: current poll->Mark()=1;
poll->Mark()–;
Activity: no poll (immediate)
input gate: I no poll
input gate predicate: sig session open-¿Mark()==0
Table 5: The activities in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
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Figure 4: “Substation Functions”: the SAN model of the substation functions.
Activity: get fake (immediate)
input gate: I get fake
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==0 && current fake->Mark()==0
&& fake->Mark()>0
input gate function: current fake->Mark()=1;
fake->Mark()–;
Activity: fake exec (stochastic)
completion rate: 3600 h−1
case 1 probability: 0.01
case 2 probability: 0.99
Activity: discard fake (immediate)
input gate: I discard fake
input gate predicate: substation ko->Mark()==1 && current fake->Mark()==0 &&
fake->Mark()>0
input gate function: current fake->Mark()=1;
fake->Mark()–;
Activity: no fake (immediate)
input gate: I no fake
input gate predicate: intrusion session open->Mark()==0
Activity: recovery (stochastic)
completion rate: 8.33333E-02 h−1
Table 6: The activities in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
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4.1.3 Modelling the packets transmission
The transmission of packets can be performed by the communication network NET1 or by NET2; packets
can be command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals or fake command copies. The SAN model
“Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5 represents this situation. The marking of the places com queue, poll queue
and fake queue represent the command copies, the poll requests and the fake command copies respectively,
waiting to be transmitted on the available communication network. Such places appear also in the SAN
model “Control Centre Functions” in Fig. 3. The marking of the places ack queue and sig queue represent
acknowledgments and signals respectively, waiting to be transmitted. Such places appear also in the SAN
model “Substation Functions” in Fig. 4.
We suppose that the bandwidth of each communication network is equal to 16 kbps and that the transmis-
sion of each packet requires to consume 1 kbps of the bandwidth (Sec. 2.1.1). This means that no more than 16
packets can be transmitted on the same communication network at the same time. The marking of the places
com out 1, poll out 1, ack out 1, sig out 1 and fake out 1 represent the number of command copies, poll re-
quests, acknowledgments, signals and fake command copies respectively that are currently under transmission
by NET1. When a token appears in com queue, the immediate activity send com completes, removing the
token, and the output gate O send com checks if the sum of the markings of com out 1, poll out 1, ack out 1,
sig out 1 and fake out 1 is less than 16 (16kbps is the bandwidth of NET1), and if the place net1 ko is
not marked (NET1 is not failed). If so, enough bandwidth is available to transmit the command copy, and
the marking of the place com out 1 will be increased by one. If instead the sum of the markings is equal
to 16 or the place net1 ko is marked, then no bandwidth is currently available on NET1: the output gate
O send com will check if the sum of the markings of com out 2, poll out 2, ack out 2, sig out 2 and fake out 2
is less than 16, and if the place net2 ko is not marked, in order to verify if some bandwidth is available on the
communication network NET2. If so, the marking of com out 2 will be increased by one. If no bandwidth
is available on both NET1 and NET2, the command copy will not be transmitted (it becomes lost). The
places net1 ko and net2 ko are present also in the SAN model “Network Failure and Repair” (Fig. 7).
The direction of poll requests, signals and fake command copies towards NET1 or NET2 is modelled
in a way similar to the command copies direction: the output gates O send poll, O send ack, O send sig,
O send fake perform the same checks and have the same effect of O send com, in case of completion of the
activities send poll, send ack, send sig, send fake respectively, due to the presence of a token inside the places
poll queue, ack queue, sig queue fake queue respectively.
The transmission of the packets by NET1 is modelled by the stochastic activity transmit 1 whose com-
pletion is ruled by the input gate I transmit 1 having the following effect:
• any token inside com out 1 is moved into the place com which represents the command copies received
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by the substations; com is the same place present in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
• Any token inside poll out 1 is moved into the place poll which represents the poll requests received by
the substations; poll is the same place present in the SAN model “Substation Functions” (Fig. 4).
• Any token inside ack out 1 is moved into the place ack which represents the acknowledgments received
by the control centre; ack is the same place present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions”
(Fig. 3).
• Any token inside sig out 1 is moved into the place sig which represents the signals received by the
control centre; sig is the same place present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3).
• Any token inside fake out 1 is moved into the place fake which represents the fake command copies
received by the substations; fake is the same place present in the SAN model “Substation Functions”
(Fig. 3).
The transmission of packets by NET2 is modelled in a similar way by the stochastic activity transmit 2 and
the input gate I transmit 2 having effect on the places com out 2 and com (transmission of command copies),
poll out 2 and poll (transmission of poll requests), ack out 2 and ack (transmission of acknowledgments),
sig out 2 and sig (transmission of signals), fake out 2 and fake (transmission of fake command copies).
The activities present in the model “Packets Transmission” in Fig. 5, together with the corresponding
input or output gates, are detailed in Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10.
4.2 Modelling the intrusion and the transmission of fake commands
The possibility of intrusions into the communication between the control centre and the substations, with
the generation of fake commands directed to the substations, is dealt by the SAN model “Intrusion” in
Fig. 6. The situation where no intruder is present is modelled by the presence of one token inside the place
intrusion idle. The occurrence of an intrusion is modelled by the activity intrusion begin whose completion
determines the move of the token from the place intrusion idle into intrusion active: this means that an
intruder is present. The generation of fake commands is represented by the stochastic activity fake gener :
while the place intrusion active is marked (input gate I fake gener), such activity is enabled to complete;
each time this happens, the place fake queue is marked with 10 tokens representing the fake command copies
to be sent to the substations. Such tokens will be consumed by the immediate activity fake send in the
SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5). The completion rates about the activities in the SAN model
“Intrusion” (Fig. 6) are reported in Table 11.
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Figure 5: “Packets Transmission”: the SAN model of the packet transmission.
Figure 6: “Intrusion”: the SAN model of the intrusion and the generation of fake commands.
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Activity: send com (immediate)
output gate: O send com
output gate predicate: if ((com out 1->Mark()+poll out 1->Mark()+ack out 1->Mark()+
sig out 1->Mark()+fake out 1->Mark() < 16) && (net1 ko->Mark()==0))
com out 1->Mark()++;
else
if ((com out 2->Mark()+poll out 2->Mark()+ack out 2->Mark()+
sig out 2->Mark()+fake out 2->Mark() ¡ 16) && (net2 ko->Mark()==0))
com out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send poll (immediate)
output gate: O send poll
output gate predicate: if ((com out 1->Mark()+poll out 1->Mark()+ack out 1->Mark()+
sig out 1->Mark()+fake out 1->Mark() < 16) && (net1 ko->Mark()==0))
poll out 1->Mark()++;
else
if ((com out 2->Mark()+poll out 2->Mark()+ack out 2->Mark()+
sig out 2->Mark()+fake out 2->Mark() < 16) && (net2 ko->Mark()==0))
poll out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send ack (immediate)
output gate: O send ack
output gate predicate: if ((com out 1->Mark()+poll out 1->Mark()+ack out 1->Mark()+
sig out 1->Mark()+fake out 1->Mark() < 16) && (net1 ko->Mark()==0))
ack out 1->Mark()++;
else
if ((com out 2->Mark()+poll out 2->Mark()+ack out 2->Mark()+
sig out 2->Mark()+fake out 2->Mark() < 16) && (net2 ko->Mark()==0))
ack out 2->Mark()++;
Table 7: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
Activity: send sig (immediate)
output gate: O send sig
output gate predicate: if ((com out 1->Mark()+poll out 1->Mark()+ack out 1->Mark()+
sig out 1->Mark()+fake out 1->Mark()<16) && (net1 ko->Mark()==0))
sig out 1->Mark()++;
else
if ((com out 2->Mark()+poll out 2->Mark()+ack out 2->Mark()+
sig out 2->Mark()+fake out 2->Mark()<16) && (net2 ko->Mark()==0))
sig out 2->Mark()++;
Activity: send fake (immediate)
output gate: O send fake
output gate predicate: if ((com out 1->Mark()+poll out 1->Mark()+ack out 1->Mark()+
fake out 1->Mark()+fake out 1->Mark()<16) && (net1 ko->Mark()==0))
fake out 1->Mark()++;
else
if ((com out 2->Mark()+poll out 2->Mark()+ack out 2->Mark()+
fake out 2->Mark()+fake out 2->Mark()<16) && (net2 ko->Mark()==0))
fake out 2->Mark()++;
Table 8: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
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Activity: transmit 1 (stochastic)
completion rate: 3600 h−1
input gate: I transmit 1
input gate predicate: (com out 1->Mark()>0) || (poll out 1->Mark()>0) ||
(ack out 1->Mark()>0) || (sig out 1->Mark()>0) || (fake out 1->Mark()>0)
input gate function: if (com out 1->Mark() > 0) {
com->Mark() = com->Mark() + com out 1->Mark();
com out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (poll out 1->Mark() > 0) {
poll->Mark() = poll->Mark() + poll out 1->Mark();
poll out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (ack out 1->Mark() > 0) {
ack->Mark() = ack->Mark() + ack out 1->Mark();
ack out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (sig out 1->Mark() > 0) {
sig->Mark() = sig->Mark() + sig out 1->Mark();
sig out 1->Mark() = 0; }
if (fake out 1->Mark() > 0) {
fake->Mark() = fake->Mark() + fake out 1->Mark();
fake out 1->Mark() = 0; }
Table 9: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
Activity: transmit 2 (stochastic)
completion rate: 3600 h−1
input gate: I transmit 2
input gate predicate: (com out 2->Mark()>0) || (poll out 2->Mark()>0) ||
(ack out 2->Mark()>0) || (sig out 2->Mark()>0) || (fake out 2->Mark()>0)
input gate function: if (com out 2->Mark() > 0) {
com->Mark() = com->Mark() + com out 2->Mark();
com out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (poll out 2->Mark() > 0) {
poll->Mark() = poll->Mark() + poll out 2->Mark();
poll out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (ack out 2->Mark() > 0) {
ack->Mark() = ack->Mark() + ack out 2->Mark();
ack out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (sig out 2->Mark() > 0) {
sig->Mark() = sig->Mark() + sig out 2->Mark();
sig out 2->Mark() = 0; }
if (fake out 2->Mark() > 0) {
fake->Mark() = fake->Mark() + fake out 2->Mark();
fake out 2->Mark() = 0; }
Table 10: The activities in the SAN model “Packets Transmission” (Fig. 5).
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Activity: intrusion begin (stochastic)
completion rate: 1.38889E-03 h−1
Activity: fake gener (stochastic)
completion rate: 1.0 h−1
input gate: I fake gener
input gate predicate: intrusion active->Mark()==1 && intrusion session open->Mark()==0
input gate function: intrusion session open->Mark()=1;
fake queue->Mark()=10;
Activity: close session
completion time: 5.55556E-03 h
Table 11: The activities in the SAN model “Intrusion” (Fig. 6).
Figure 7: “Network Failure and Repair”: the SAN model of the communication networks failure and repair.
4.3 Modelling the communication network failure
The failure and the repair of the communication network NET1 or NET2 is represented by the SAN model
“Network Failure and Repair” in Fig. 7. The working state of NET1 is represented by the presence of one
token inside the place net1 ok. The failure of NET1 is modelled by the stochastic activity net1 fail whose
effect is moving the token from the place net1 ok into net1 ko. In this way, we model the failed state of
NET1. Its repair is represented by the stochastic activity net1 repair whose completion determines the move
of the token from the place net1 ko into net1 ok. In this way, we model the return of NET1 to the working
state.
The failure and repair of NET2 is modelled in a specular way in the right side of the SAN model “Net-
work Failure and Repair” in Fig. 7. The places net1 ko and net2 ko appear also in the SAN model “Pack-
ets Transmission” (Fig. 5). The completion rates of the activities in the model “Network Failure and Repair”
(Fig. 7) are reported in Table 12.
4.4 Modelling the scenarios
In the previous sections, we presented the SAN model for each aspect of the case study. Several SAN
models have some common places, for instance the place net1 ko is present both in “Packets Transmission”
and in “Network Failure and Repair” ((Fig. 5) and Fig. 7) modelling the transmission of packets and the
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Activity: net1 fail (stochastic)
completion rate: 1.38889E-03 h−1
Activity: net1 repair (stochastic)
completion rate: 8.33333E-02 h−1
Activity: net2 fail (stochastic)
completion rate: 1.38889E-03 h−1
Activity: net2 repair (stochastic)
completion rate: 8.33333E-02 h−1
Table 12: The activities in the SAN model “Network Failure and Repair” (Fig. 7).
communication network failure and repair, respectively. The Mo¨bius tool allows to merge together the
several SAN model by superposition over the common places. Moreover, it allows to replicate several times
the same SAN model, with the possibility for the model replicas, of sharing some places. To this aim, it is
possible to build a composed model based on the Join and the Replicate operators allowing the merge and
the replication of SAN models respectively, as mentioned in Sec. 3.
In this report, we are interested to evaluate the case study in the scenarios defined in Sec. 2.3. The
model of each scenario is obtained by replicating and merging some of the SAN models presented in the
previous sections. The composed model for the Scenario 1 is shown in Fig. 8 where the SAN model “Sub-
station Functions” is replicated 10 times in order to model the presence of 10 substations: the places com,
ack queue, poll, sig queue and fake are shared by the replicas. The result of the replication, “Substation Set”,
is merged (joined) with the SAN models “Control Centre Functions” and “Packets Transmission” concern-
ing the command and signal sessions, and with the SAN model “Intrusion” concerning the possibility of
intrusions and generation of fake commands.
The composed model for the Scenario 2 is obtained by composing the SAN models according to Fig. 9
where “Substation Functions” is still replicated 10 times in order to represent the presence of 10 substations.
The result, “Substation Set”, is joined with “Control Centre Functions” and “Packets Transmission” in order
to model the command and signal sessions, and with the SAN model “Network Failure and Repair” about
the failure and the repair of the communication networks.
The composed model for the Scenario 3 is shown in Fig. 10 where “Substation Functions” is replicated
10 times in order to obtain the set of substations (“Substation Set”) which is in turn joined with “Con-
trol Centre Functions”, “Packets Transmission”, “Network Failure and Repair”, and “Intrusion”. In this way
both the intrusions and the communication network failures are considered in the scenario.
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Figure 8: The composed model of the Scenario 1.
Figure 9: The composed model of the Scenario 2.
Figure 10: The composed model of the Scenario 3.
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5 Simulation results
The composed models described in the previous section have been object of simulation. For each scenario,
10000 simulation batches have been performed by means of Mo¨bius, requiring a confidence level equal to 0.95,
and a relative confidence interval equal to 0.1. The measures computed by the simulation are :
• Prcom(t): the probability that at least one command session has failed at a certain time;
• Prsig(t): the probability that at least one signal session has failed at a certain time;
• Numcom(t): mean number of failed command sessions at a certain time;
• Numsig(t): mean number of failed command sessions at a certain time.
All measures are computed for a mission time varying between 0 and 10000 h.
The first measure, Prcom(t), is computed as the mean value over the 10000 simulation batches, of the
reward rew1 having the following expression:
if (Control_Centre_Functions->com_session_failed->Mark()>0)
rew1=1;
else
rew1=0;
This means that in each simulation batch and at a certain time, rew1 is equal to 1 if the place com session failed
contains at least one token, or it is equal to 0 if the same place is empty. The place com session failed is
present in the SAN model “Control Centre Functions” (Fig. 3) and it indicates the number of failed com-
mand sessions. So, the mean value of rew1 at a certain time, over the 10000 simulation batches, provides the
probability that at least one command session has failed at a certain time. The values of Prcom(t) returned
by the simulation for each scenario are reported in Table 13 and are depicted in Fig. 11.
The measure Prsig(t) is computed in a similar way: it is the mean value over the 10000 simulation batches,
of the reward rew2 whose expression follows:
if (Control_Centre_Functions->sig_session_failed->Mark()>0)
rew2=1;
else
rew2=0;
The place sig session failed is present in Fig. 3 and it indicates the number of failed signal sessions. The
mean value of rew2 as a function of the time, provides the value of Prsig(t). Table 14 shows the results
obtained for such measure in each scenario. The same results appear in Fig. 12.
Both Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show that according to the event occurrence times specified in Sec. 2 and the
SAN models described in Sec. 4, the intrusions (Scenario 1) determine a higher probability of command or
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time Prcom(t) in Scenario 1 Prcom(t) in Scenario 2 Prcom(t) in Scenario 3
1000 h 6,960E-02 4,880E-02 1,147E-01
2000 h 1,402E-01 9,110E-02 2,206E-01
3000 h 2,031E-01 1,366E-01 3,111E-01
4000 h 2,627E-01 1,768E-01 4,012E-01
5000 h 3,161E-01 2,180E-01 4,723E-01
6000 h 3,688E-01 2,565E-01 5,400E-01
7000 h 4,140E-01 2,926E-01 5,944E-01
8000 h 4,576E-01 3,258E-01 6,422E-01
9000 h 4,963E-01 3,608E-01 6,835E-01
10000 h 5,322E-01 3,913E-01 7,178E-01
Table 13: The probability that at least one command session has failed (Prcom(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2,
Scenario 3 (the same values are reported in Fig. 11).
Figure 11: The probability that at least one command session has failed (Prcom(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario
2, Scenario 3 (the same values are reported in Tab. 13).
time Prsig(t) in Scenario 1 Prsig(t) in Scenario 2 Prsig(t) in Scenario 3
1000 h 1,162E-01 7,060E-02 1,746E-01
2000 h 2,261E-01 1,305E-01 3,259E-01
3000 h 3,192E-01 1,888E-01 4,480E-01
4000 h 4,035E-01 2,468E-01 5,521E-01
5000 h 4,747E-01 3,024E-01 6,348E-01
6000 h 5,375E-01 3,519E-01 7,041E-01
7000 h 5,937E-01 3,962E-01 7,592E-01
8000 h 6,446E-01 4,348E-01 8,022E-01
9000 h 6,871E-01 4,749E-01 8,389E-01
10000 h 7,261E-01 5,080E-01 8,677E-01
Table 14: The probability that at least one signal session has failed (Prsig(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2,
Scenario 3 (the same values are reported in Fig. 12).
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Figure 12: The probability that at least one signal session has failed (Prsig(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2,
Scenario 3 (the same values are reported in Tab. 14).
signal session failure, with respect to the communication network failures (Scenario 2). In the Scenario 1, a
command or signal session fails if at least two substations are unavailable at the same time due to execution
of fake commands (N − 1 acknowledgments (signals) have to be received by the control centre before the
closure of the command (signal) session). In the Scenario 2 instead, some packets are lost causing the session
failure, if a communication network (NET1 or NET2) is failed and a command session is running in parallel
with a signal session, or if an intruder is generating a fake command in parallel with a command (signal)
session. In this situation, it may happen that the available communication network is not enough to transmit
all the packets (command copies, acknowledgments, poll requests, signals, fake command copies). Still in
the Scenario 2, if both communication networks are failed at the same time, this will lead to the loss of
packets. Given the simulation results obtained for the Scenario 1 and the Scenario 2, we can conclude that
the intrusions have a higher negative influence to the communication reliability, with respect to the network
failures.
In the Scenario 3, a command or a signal session can fail due to an intrusions, to the substations unavail-
ability as a consequence of the execution of a fake command, or to both causes. For instance, a command
session may fail because one acknowledgment is missing due to the current unavailability of one substation,
and another acknowledgment is missing due to a failure affecting one of the communication networks. Actu-
ally, observing both Fig. 11 (Prcom(t)) and Fig. 12, (Prsig(t)) and the corresponding values in Table 13 and
in Table 14 respectively, we notice that the probability of failure of a command (signal) session at a certain
time in the Scenario 3, is always higher than the corresponding probabilities in the Scenario 1 and in the
Scenario 2. This is due to the occurrence of both causes of command or signal session failure.
The values obtained for Prcom(t) and Prsig(t) are compared in Fig. 13 (Scenario 1), in Fig. 14 (Scenario
2) and in Fig. 15 (Scenario 3). In all the scenarios, we can notice that Prsig(t) is higher than Prcom(t) for any
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time Numcom(t) in Scenario 1 Numcom(t) in Scenario 2 Numcom(t) in Scenario 3
1000 h 1,6190E-01 7,6400E-02 2,3490E-01
2000 h 3,3100E-01 1,4070E-01 4,9440E-01
3000 h 4,9900E-01 2,1330E-01 7,3210E-01
4000 h 6,7590E-01 2,8110E-01 9,8530E-01
5000 h 8,5270E-01 3,6060E-01 1,2226E+00
6000 h 1,0354E+00 4,3330E-01 1,4790E+00
7000 h 1,2031E+00 5,0790E-01 1,7199E+00
8000 h 1,3759E+00 5,7990E-01 1,9613E+00
9000 h 1,5411E+00 6,5740E-01 2,2088E+00
10000 h 1,7088E+00 7,2770E-01 2,4378E+00
Table 15: The mean number of failed signal sessions (Numcom(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3 (the
same values are reported in Fig. 16).
time; this is due to the fact that during a situation leading to the loss of packets (substations unavailability,
communication network failure, or both), the number of signal sessions performed is higher than the number
of command sessions (the time between two signal sessions is 5 min., while the time between two command
sessions is 6 h on average). This leads to a higher number of failed signal sessions, with respect to the number
of failed command sessions, as confirmed by the results obtained for the next measures.
The mean number of failed command sessions (Numcom(t)) is computed as the mean value over the 10000
simulation batches, of the reward rew3 whose expression is:
rew3=Control_Centre_Functions->com_session_failed->Mark();
This means that rew3 is equal to the marking of the place com session failed in the model “Control Centre Functions”
(Fig. 3); therefore rew3 in a certain batch and at a certain time is equal to the number of failed command
sessions at that time. The mean value of rew3 at a certain time, over the 10000 simulation batches, provides
the mean value of failed command sessions at that time (Numcom(t)). The values of Numcom(t) returned
by the simulation for each scenario are reported in Table 15 and are depicted in Fig. 16 (consider that the
number of command sessions during 10000 h is about 1665).
The measure Numsig(t) is computed in a similar way: it corresponds to the mean value of the reward
rew4 equal to the marking of the place sig session failed in Fig. 3:
rew4=Control_Centre_Functions->sig_session_failed->Mark();
The value of rew4 in a certain batch and at a certain time provides the number of failed signal sessions. The
mean value of rew4 at a certain time, over the 10000 simulation batches, provides Numsig(t) at the same
time. Table 16 shows the results obtained for such measure in each scenario. The same results appear in
Fig. 17 (consider that the number of signal sessions during 10000 h is 112500).
The results obtained for the measures Numcom(t) (Fig. 16) and Numsig(t) (Fig. 17) confirm that the
intrusions (Scenario 1) negatively influence the communication reliability, more than the network failures do
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Figure 13: Scenario 1: the probability that at least one command session has failed (Prcom(t)); the probability
that at least one command session has failed (Prsig(t)).
Figure 14: Scenario 2: the probability that at least one command session has failed (Prcom(t)); the probability
that at least one command session has failed (Prsig(t)).
Figure 15: Scenario 3: the probability that at least one command session has failed (Prcom(t)); the probability
that at least one command session has failed (Prsig(t)).
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Figure 16: The mean number of failed command sessions (Numcom(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3
(the same values are reported in Tab. 15).
time Numsig(t) in Scenario 1 Numsig(t) in Scenario 2 Numsig(t) in Scenario 3
1000 h 1,124140E+01 3,203100E+00 1,379090E+01
2000 h 2,242070E+01 5,795200E+00 2,845390E+01
3000 h 3,380230E+01 8,690400E+00 4,258610E+01
4000 h 4,550530E+01 1,155400E+01 5,777010E+01
5000 h 5,712560E+01 1,484340E+01 7,253720E+01
6000 h 6,902630E+01 1,781620E+01 8,751700E+01
7000 h 8,086260E+01 2,073570E+01 1,017083E+02
8000 h 9,275740E+01 2,389450E+01 1,161295E+02
9000 h 1,042070E+02 2,697450E+01 1,310697E+02
10000 h 1,154704E+02 2,978360E+01 1,451636E+02
Table 16: The mean number of failed command sessions (Numsig(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3
(the same valued are reported in Fig. 17).
Figure 17: The mean number of failed signal sessions (Numsig(t)) in Scenario 1, Scenario 2, Scenario 3 (the
same valued are reported in Tab. 16).
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(Scenario 2). In Scenario 3, the occurrence of both causes of command or signal session failure, determine
higher values for Numcom(t) and Numsig(t), with respect to the Scenario 1 and the Scenario 2, as it happens
for Prcom(t) and Prsig(t).
6 Conclusions
This report presented the modelling of communication scenarios between one control centre and a set of
substations exchanging commands and signals inside an area of a distribution grid, where the communication
reliability may be affected by attacks, failures, or both. The scenarios have been modelled, simulated and
evaluated by means of SAN allowing to represent both the deterministic and the stochastic events, in case of
normal functioning and in case of threats. The simulation of the SAN models of the scenarios provided the
effect of the threats in terms of probability and quantity of lost data.
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